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The present course of assessing debt sustainability – toward further econometric 
sophistication – risks being more harmful than helpful. To develop support for this 
claim, this paper first recounts what economic theory says about sovereign debt, and 
then continues by analysing the methodology and approach that the assessment 
of debt sustainability rests on today. Building on these accounts, this paper argues 
that debt sustainability should be lifted away from the narrow econometric seat 
where it is now found and, instead, should be placed in between problem debt 
on the one side and economic and social human rights on the other. The paper 
concludes by proposing an orderly framework promoting equal rights of debtor and 
creditor nations in debt negotiations. Importantly, it is up to the indebted nation to 
decide on the sustainability of its sovereign debt, not the creditors.
Some, usually defenders of unfettered capitalism, are convinced that high levels 
of indebtedness in a country is a consequence of poor economic policy where a 
nation has lived beyond its means and therefore, the government must decrease 
its expenditure and raise its income (see Euronews 2011; Blanchard & Leigh 2013; 
Torry 2013). Accordingly, it is up to the creditors to decide whether they grant 
financial rescue packages to the indebted country or not, and under what conditions. 
Others agree in seeing mounting debt as a consequence of economic policy, but 
their view is global, not national (see Krugman & Layard 2010; Raffer 2010; Stiglitz 
2010b; see also Palley 2003; UNCTAD 2009b for complementary arguments). This 
Keynesian view sees one nation’s current account deficit as another’s surplus and 
therefore, regards overindebtedness to be a common global concern. Importantly, 
the austerity measures proposed by those supporting unfettered capitalism stand 
in contrast to the prescriptions of the Keynesians, who argue for shifting the 
focus away from debt levels and toward promoting full employment by means of 
increasing domestic spending and investments. 
Between these views, one of the questions that arises forcefully is how to 
decide on the sustainability of sovereign debt. Attempts at pin-pointing thresholds 
for sustainable debt levels are often linked to low-income countries and always 
Sehm-Patomäki
123
econometrically estimated (Caner, Grennes & Koehler-Geib 2011, 73; Cecchetti, 
Mohanty & Zampolli 2011; Manasse, Roubini & Schimmelpfennig 2003; Reinhart & 
Rogoff 2010, see also Addison, Hansen & Tarp 2004). These efforts are contested 
for not taking into account the historical developments or circumstances of the 
debt build-up, for ignoring the specific characteristics of sovereign debt versus 
other forms of debt, and for not distinguishing between different components of 
sovereign debt (Herndon, Ash, Pollin 2013; Nersisyan & Wray 2010). It is possible 
that identifying a universal threshold or ratio of debt without arbitrariness is not even 
feasible. If so, a continued focus on macroeconomic sophistication and technical 
detail will not make the assessments more accurate, but rather, risks blurring the 
broad purpose of dealing with problem debt (see Wyplosz 2009). What we need is 
a shift in focus, approach and methodology. It is not only about determining when 
debts become unsustainable, but also how this is decided upon, by whom and 
through what process.
The general point of this article is that establishing thresholds of sovereign 
debt, even if they were feasible, may in fact be more harmful than helpful. This is 
because the welfare of a country’s citizens must not be sacrificed in the name of 
unpredictable or speculative sovereign-debt markets or inadequate or short-term 
fiscal calculations as a reaction to such thresholds (see Stein & Weeks 2012). 
Instead, the purpose must be to promote the economically sustainable well-being 
of the population in both creditor and debtor nations by dealing with problem debt 
not only in an orderly way but also in a swift, sustainable and just manner. The 
carrying argument of this article is that debt sustainability is a political matter that 
must be assessed by the indebted nation and this assessment cannot be based 
on econometric parameters alone. This is due to the peculiar characteristics 
of sovereign debt where a nation’s resources are infinite because of its right to 
levy taxes. In support of this argument, there are two additional and particular 
qualifications to keep in mind; debt sustainability must be placed in its proper 
frames of politics and justice where it belongs.
First, popular uprisings in indebted nations in response to budgets cuts and 
social hardship should be given the appropriate attention for the political crises that 
they are. This relates to the protection of human rights – and social and economic 
rights in particular – in the indebted country, with reference to the Charter of the 
United Nations where governments are obliged to provide a minimal standard 
of living for their people. Such uprisings can be seen as a reaction to the strain 
between the two sets of principles behind the global institutional order: the global 
financial structure was established at Bretton Woods in 1944 and four years later 
the UN adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. These two institutional, 
parallel paradigms form a tension between protecting the advantageous positions 
of rich nations on the one hand and securing equal rights for every individual on 
the other. Second, the justice dimension that promotes the role of the indebted 
nation in debt negotiations requires further attention. This is because so far, the 
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determination of sustainable debt levels is in the hands of creditors with an interest 
in getting their investments repaid, and the debtors have little say. 
This article does not seek to contribute to the theoretical discussions on 
sovereign debt, nor at adding to the literature analyzing the technicalities or empirical 
research of debt sustainability measures or contrasting them to each other. Instead, 
this article hopes to contribute to the discussions on global governance and the 
overall thinking on the principles behind the tolerance levels of sovereign debt. This 
contribution provides a complement to the body of literature promoting the idea of 
putting in place an orderly mechanism for dealing with problem debt (see Helleiner 
2008; Herman, Ocampo & Spiegel 2010a; Palley 2003; Raffer 1990; Schwarcz 
2000; Smith 1776/2009; Soederberg 2005 and Stiglitz 2002a among others). While 
the suggested principles of the mechanism that these proposals rest on vary within 
a fairly wide range, they unite in calling for a mechanism to deal with unsustainable 
debt burdens. Yet, the proposals leave open the definition of debt sustainability. 
This article is divided into four parts. This first section reviews the literature on 
the theoretical considerations regarding the dynamics and peculiarities of sovereign 
debt. In dealing properly with sovereign debt, we must understand its particularities. 
Comparisons between sovereign debt and other forms of debt must be made with 
caution. This includes clearly and consistently separating our thinking along the 
lines of private, individual or corporate debt on the one hand and sovereign debt on 
the other. In the second section the focus shifts to an analysis of where we stand 
in the empirical field of assessing debt sustainability, including the methodology 
behind the current econometrically-derived debt sustainability assessments 
and suggested universal debt thresholds. The third section explains the political 
and ideological process behind contemporary dealings with debt and argues for 
an orderly framework for nations to declare that their debt is unsustainable as 
an alternative. Since a country can never go bankrupt in the same sense as a 
corporation, the sustainability of sovereign debt is a political issue that cannot be 
limited to economic factors alone. The fourth section concludes that a politically 
unsustainable debt burden is unsustainable also from an economic point of view, 
and to fulfil the justice dimension of problem debt, the unsustainability of debts 
must be declared by the indebted nation, not its creditors. 
I. Separating sovereign debt from other forms of debt
Dealing with crises of sovereign debt in the post-World War period resembles 
an opt-in system. This has led to incremental processes and negotiations, both 
unofficial and official. Importantly, the ad hoc way of meeting debt crises has in 
effect led to a slow process of institutionalization: debt crises are systematically 
met with austerity requirements by the creditors toward the debtors. There are three 
justifications for this. One, the requirements for austerity policies became dominant 
in the 1980s following the general shift in economic thinking from Keynesianism 
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towards unregulated capitalism. The new thinking supported the interpretation that 
the reason behind debt build-up is over-spending and, therefore, the prescription 
was belt-tightening. Two, belt-tightening policies echo the preferences and logic of 
credit-rating agencies. Investors react to assumed ratios of debt sustainability and, 
consequently, demand fiscal austerity programmes to cut government spending. 
This is because they react to debt-to-gross domestic product ratios and thus demand 
immediate improvements in these conditions. Three, in the official discourse, where 
public debt is often compared to private debt, belt-tightening policies are dominant. 
This analogy has re-emerged with the Euro crisis, where the media, politicians 
and observers often assume sovereign debt to have the same characteristics as 
personal or corporate debts. The conclusion from this assumption is then that just 
like a personal credit card debt, a mortgage or a corporate loan, this debt must 
eventually be paid off and the way to go about this is to agree on a plan that will 
allow the borrower to pay off his, her or its debt. 
Consequently, when a government declares its inability to meet its payments 
obligations on time, this results in a plan for how to cut spending, according to any 
of the lines of thinking above. The plan is always swift in implementation and often 
drastic in measure. The immediate aim of decreasing debt levels becomes the 
main focus. To cast doubt on these uniform and seemingly automatic requirements 
for austerity policies, it is essential to separate out the particular characteristics of 
sovereign debt. Sovereign debt is not well understood, and it is often surrounded 
by misconceptions. 
To begin with, it is fundamental to sort out the meaning of open and closed 
systems. The general principles on which a business and a national economy must 
be run are different (Krugman 2009, 27, 30). Business people, for instance, are not 
used to thinking about closed systems; economists are (Krugman 2009, 33). This 
means two things. First, in theory and from a business perspective, an open system 
implies that a(ny) corporation could well realise its goal of doubling its market share 
in say, two years. At the same time, the economist realises the impossibility of 
every company actually doubling its market share in the same two-year period 
− whether nationally or globally. Globally, countries with exports exceeding their 
imports create a surplus versus those countries that import more than they export. 
Global trade balances always equal zero, which means that someone’s surplus is 
always someone else’s deficit. But it is also not unproblematic to be a big surplus 
nation, as this would mean that the demand in its export markets is suppressed. 
This was the carrying thought of John Maynard Keynes (1943), who thought that it 
is in the global interest to tax not only deficit but also surplus nations. 
But sovereign debt must not be approached solely from the point of view of 
economic theory. The second meaning of economists operating on the assumption 
of closed systems is methodological and concerns the very foundations of 
economics. Their preferred method is econometrics, and with this comes a search 
for, or at least an assumption of, closed systems. But for a system to be closed, 
it has to fulfil both the intrinsic and extrinsic condition (Sayer 1984, 121–25). The 
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intrinsic condition says that if mechanisms are to operate consistently, there can 
be no change in the object that possesses the causal powers. Other things being 
equal, problem debt will not produce regular effects if the internal composition of 
the debt changes. The extrinsic condition for closure says that for the outcome 
to be regular, the relationship between the causal mechanism and those of its 
external conditions, which may make a difference to its operation and effects, must 
be constant. If the political sympathies of the population of the country struggling 
with problem debt change for reasons independent of the debt burden, the effect 
of debt sustainability assessments cannot be said to be manifested as a regularity. 
Further, sovereign debt is made up of various kinds of debt; private, public, 
external or internal. There is a fairly fundamental difference between domestic 
and external debt, or fiscal versus external sustainability. These debts build up as 
a result of different and separate mechanisms and, as a consequence, there are 
no quick-fix budgetary transfers available to solve any one problem. The ability to 
generate international currency to pay interest and principal is not directly related to 
a country’s ability to grow or to broaden its tax base (see UNCTAD 2009b, 20–24, 
also for the latter part of this paragraph). This is because international currency is 
generated through exports whereas taxation is levied on labour and domestically 
produced goods and services. For instance, the US trade deficit is a result of an 
imbalance in its current account; the US has imported more than it has exported. 
This is also why Keynes (1929) criticized the idea that a large external debt is 
mainly a budgetary problem. Fiscal sustainability provides another example of how 
a concept suffers from inexact definitions.1 Usually, it stands for the stabilizing of 
a particular debt-to-GDP ratio but does not say anything about the optimality of 
this ratio. Also, the indicator does not establish the conditions necessary for long-
run sustainability, and thus does not provide space for counter-cyclical polices, 
such as a government increasing its national spending in hard economic times. To 
complicate matters further, there are no good definitions of external or domestic 
debt. Confusing determinants are the country of residence of the creditor and the 
place of issue, and legislation that regulates the debt contract. 
In dealing with these different forms of debt, attempts at bridging the gaps 
with the help of loans do not address mend the cause of the deficits. Also, debt 
balancing must be done with caution; a sudden swing from deficit to surplus in the 
current accounts of a nation, if the deficit originates from a capital flow reversal, 
may have serious economic costs in the form of inflation, or Dutch disease.2 This 
means that a government seeking to balance its books must not make cutting the 
deficit its only focus. 
1 For instance, see Ghosh, Kim, Mendoza, Ostry & Qureshi (2011) for an attempt at answering the 
question of how high public debt can rise without compromising fiscal solvency.
2 Dutch disease stands for a situation when a country receives a large inflow of foreign currency, 
for instance in the form of aid, as disaster aid relief, or from natural resources (oil is an often 
mentioned favourite in this context). Eventually, this leads to a rise in the exchange rate, which 




Belt-tightening in the household comes without the structural effects of belt-
tightening by the government. Actually, deficit reduction in response to situations of 
high sovereign debt brings with it a real danger. When a government raises taxes 
and cuts benefits in response to high levels of debt, not only are the vulnerable in 
society affected, but job opportunities decrease and, in the long run, the effects of 
the cuts are long lasting. If the focus is blindly fixed on cutting deficits, the long-
term goal of supporting an educated and healthy population is suppressed and so 
are the chances of future economic growth. The point here is the relation between 
long-term debt and investments in education, technology, health care, social 
benefits and infrastructure: sectors where investments in the long-term could lead 
to lowered deficits. Instead of focusing on the deficit and on what the country owes, 
one must also look at its assets (Stiglitz 2010b). The reliance on Gross Domestic 
Product, GDP, as an indicator of national wealth comes with a set of warnings, as 
we shall see. For now, the point is that particular budget outcomes should never be 
a policy target. What the government should be targeting is real goals, such as a 
sustainable growth rate buoyed by full employment (Gee 2011). As a consequence 
of these targets, a weaker economy calls for a larger deficit and the appropriate 
size of the deficit in the face of a recession depends on the precise circumstances 
(Stiglitz 2010b).
Austerity policies thus shrink the GDPs of their nations. With a lower GDP, 
the debt-to-GDP ratio is bound to grow. Those promoting austerity see this as a 
temporary and necessary phase. But the history of austerity is not encouraging: 
it failed in Latin America, Africa, East Asia and will fail in Europe (Stiglitz 2011). 
The austerity policies applied in the Euro nations suffering from debt problems 
have resulted in high unemployment levels approaching 27 per cent in Greece 
and 26 per cent in Spain (EUROSTAT 2013). From that perspective, the focus 
on stricter budgetary discipline is not enough to cure Europe’s problems. A few 
years ago, for instance, Germany’s budget deficit was higher than Spain’s, but 
the competitiveness of the German economy far outpaced that of its southern 
neighbours (Alderman 2012). This is why hundreds of economists have forcefully 
expressed in open letters to policy makers their concern at how the European 
debt crisis is being dealt with (Krugman & Layard 2012; Sinn 2012). This traditional 
default position of the International Monetary Fund, to require austerity measures 
for overindebted nations, has arrived at a crossroads with the Euro crisis, since 
empirical research shows that the IMF may have based its forecasts on fiscal 
multipliers that were too high (Blanchard & Leigh 2013). 
Unlike individuals or corporations, governments do not have to repay their 
debts. In fact, they rarely run down their overall stock of debt, and the history of 
sovereign defaults is neither short nor unimportant (Gee 2011; see also Reinhart & 
Rogoff 2009 for a catalogue of such defaults). This is because a government has 
its own central bank and currency and if need be, it can always print more of its 
own currency. This helps explain why the US can sustain such high and increasing 
levels of debt; other countries also borrow in US dollars, but they do not have 
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the added advantage of printing the currency. Given this, the US may be more 
vulnerable to the risk of prolonged economic stagnation than to a sudden crisis 
− thus following in Japan’s footsteps (Sahadi 2012). The inflation risk associated 
with printing money is generally seen as a drawback because of the higher interest 
rates this may bring with it and the consequences this has on society. But this 
has to be balanced against the advantage of actually melting the debt at the rate 
of the inflation. Yet, the initiative of printing money does not hold automatically for 
the Euro zone, at least not in the way the currency union is now organised. In the 
Euro zone, by creating an independent central bank, the member countries have 
become indebted in a currency that they do not control.
Because of its right to tax, in theory, a nation has indefinite resources on which to 
draw. This is also why the sustainability (or illiquidity versus solvency) of sovereign 
debt is less easy to calculate than for instance the solvency of an individual or a 
corporation. In basic economics, a debt is solvent when the future surplus is large 
enough to repay the debt, principal and interest. In practice, however, deep social 
unrest in response to austerity measures is an indicator of the population’s (in)
tolerance of the level of debt. 
Sovereign debt also differs from private debt in that the resources of a nation 
cannot be liquidated as in, for instance, the case of the bankruptcy of a firm. To 
illustrate, a loan made to a country for it to improve its infrastructure may leave 
behind roads, bridges and buildings which are impossible to transport abroad and 
thus troublesome to claim by the creditors.
Finally, market-oriented societies have laws and insolvency proceedings for 
corporations and individuals. But if a country has high levels of problem debt, 
there is no instance that would have the legitimacy or the expertise to oversee an 
international, orderly, fair and speedy process of dealing with global debt. This role 
has largely been played by the IMF. But the IMF is itself a creditor, which means that 
it is neither an objective nor an impartial institution for dealing with these matters. In 
practice though the narrative is usually more acute than analytical. Often, sudden 
financial or banking crises are followed by debt and economic crises. This means 
that what has turned into a debt crisis may still be treated as a (temporary) financial 
crisis of liquid cash. The call to the IMF is about ad hoc and immediate financial 
support. Often, there is little space and not enough time for a thorough assessment 
of the situation. In response to reactions in the markets, quick reductions of deficits 
and debts are undertaken. Such austerity policies tend to create social unrest, as 
seen most recently in Southern Europe, and, ultimately, the financial crisis turns 
into a political crisis. 
Within these cornerstones of the theory of sovereign debt, there are major 
differences about the perceived accurateness of theories and, consequently, about 
the appropriate economic models. Given this, there will always be disagreements 
about the assessments, their priorities and emphases (as reminded by Stiglitz 
2010a, 62). This is also why this review has focussed on the dynamics, the settings 
and the qualifications of sovereign debt, rather than policy prescriptions of individual 
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cases. With this in mind, the next section looks into the lessons learned from the 
empirical work on debt sustainability.
II. Considerations regarding assessments 
of debt sustainability
Debt sustainability is a young concept and the assessments are part of a process 
which is itself in development. To date, the empirical observations are primarily 
limited to low-income countries in Latin America and Africa.3 Debt sustainability 
assessments form the very core of debt relief programmes and it is also in this 
context that the analyses to date have been framed.4 There are six particular 
concerns that can be separated out from these systematised practices. One, the 
fairly wide range of different meanings of debt sustainability confuses its application 
and complicates further work. Two, the methodology and specific variables merit 
further analysis. Three, debt sustainability assessments are, to varying degrees, 
based on GDP, a crude concept itself. Four, traditionally, situations of problem debt 
are not separated into situations of insolvency and temporary states of illiquidity, 
but all situations are treated in similar fashion and with a state of urgency. Five, 
debt sustainability is always assessed by the creditors, and the indebted nation has 
little say in the process. Six, the attempt to assess debt sustainability according 
to universal criteria carries risks. Among other issues, the assessments leave out 
historic developments behind the building of debt while ignoring the dynamics related 
to debt sustainability. This is also the order in which the groups are discussed. 
 Underneath the general definition of debt sustainability that stands for 
when a country’s debt becomes too big for it to be serviced, a number of more 
specific definitions compete.5 Some relate debt sustainability to national budgetary 
problems while others relate it to transfer problems (Addison et al. 2004, 8; UNCTAD 
2009b, 20). Alternatively, it may or may not include the effect debt-servicing bears 
on economic growth or poverty alleviation (see Addison et al. 2004, 8–11). Or 
debt sustainability may focus on a country’s willingness or capacity to serve its 
debt. These definitions leave to the side a broader set of issues related to the 
country’s overall economic performance. For instance, a country can service its 
3 For helpful compilations of articles, see UNCTAD (2009a; 2009b).
4 The frames are the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries-programmes, HIPC (1996–), the Debt 
Sustainability Analysis, DSA (2002–) and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative, MDRI (2005–).
5 This can be categorized into six key concepts of varying definitions of debt sustainability: A. 
Threshold level of debt/GDP, ratio; B. Solvency, or the condition that future surpluses on current 
account are sufficient to cover interest obligations and repayments of principal; C. Debt serviceability, 
or solvency plus the additional condition of no illiquidity, which denotes an inability to service debts 
at particular moments in time; D. Solvency plus avoidance of the need for a major correction in the 
form of large cuts in public expenditure or large increases in taxation required for debt service; E. 
Networth, or the condition that the present value of current account surpluses less current debt is 
not decreasing over time; and finally F. Debt stationarity, or the condition that the debt/GDP ratio 
does not increase beyond certain limits. (Cornford 2009, 3; Wyplosz 2009, 21.)
Dictatorship of Failure
130
debt according to plan, but simultaneously, the basis of debt sustainability effects 
the eligibility of aid. If so, in the long run, debt relief risks leading to accumulated 
debts all over again. A fourth meaning takes on board aspects related to growth 
(for literature reviews see IMF 2012b, 121–128; Reinhart, Reinhart & Rogoff 2012). 
Because of the variation in the application of the term, its definition becomes both 
vague and general in a way that jeopardises its usefulness. 
Further, the methodology of assessing debt sustainability requires attention. To 
begin with, the twin conditions for closed systems from the pervious section calls 
into question the dominant focus on empirical methodology when assessing debt 
sustainability, a methodology assuming closed systems. For example, regarding 
the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative and the sustainability 
issue in particular, the methodology is static and based on historical data in 
that it does not include provision for shocks or drastic changes in the country’s 
economic environment, such as falling terms-of-trade (Addison et al. 2004, 11). 
What is more, inflation is often ignored in debt sustainability analyses (Wyplosz 
2009, 8). Traditionally, debt sustainability exercises for low-income countries have 
concentrated on external debt. This dates back to the early 1990s when most 
external debt of poor counties was public and most public debt of low-income 
countries was external (UNCTAD 2009b, 20). But importantly the composition of 
sovereign debt has changed since then: private external debt and domestic public 
debt have become increasingly important, if not major, forms of debt. However 
defined, debt sustainability includes a large number of uncertainties; it is about 
probabilities rather than certainty (Wyplosz 2009). Essentially, the assessments 
are only valid within the bounds of the underlying guesses. The IMF’s Debt 
Sustainability Assessment, for instance, has drawn macroeconomic policy making 
to a cross-roads where there is little support for the idea that added complexity 
allows for more precise assessments. It is a partial guide that should not be 
interpreted in too rigid or mechanical fashion (as underlined by the IMF (2012a) 
itself). Yet, because of its large degree of uncertainty, Wyplosz (2009) concludes 
that the DSA procedure is impossible: the process is too arbitrary and imprecise to 
serve as a tool for policy prescription. 
In practice, the sustainability of sovereign debt is assessed either on how well 
debt can be serviced out of export earnings, or on how debt relates to GDP. This 
is important to take note of for three reasons. One, the debt-to-export ratios are 
problematic because a large export sector is not enough to generate the needed 
resources if import growth outpaces export growth (UNCTAD 2009b, 20). Two, 
neither are debt-to-GDP or debt-to-revenues ratios adequate measures of a 
country’s ability to repay its external debt (recalling that external debt builds as 
a result of a need for foreign currency to pay for imports if they exceed exports) 
(UNCTAD 2009b, 20). Three, GDP itself is still an unrefined concept, and this of 
course relates to debt sustainability assessments based on GDP. To exemplify, 
because GDP reflects an average, the segmentation of society is left unnoticed: 
as the investment bankers of society get rich, they augment average income thus 
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leaving the decrease in income by potentially large segments of the population 
unnoticed. Today’s sustainability assessments stand for the depletion of national 
resources and the degradation of the environment, where the processes should 
instead be arguing for guidance for creating a broader set of indicators that more 
accurately capture both the economic well-being and sustainability of nations’ and 
ultimately, the earth’s, resources (Stiglitz, Sen & Fitoussi 2010). Ultimately, it is 
not possible to reduce everything to a single number, GDP (Stiglitz et al. 2010). 
Moreover, natural assets are often hard to price well or at all. The Inclusive Wealth 
Report 2012 provides an attempt at assessing changes in a country’s productive 
base, including produced, human, and natural capital over time (UNU 2012). The 
reason behind this initiative is that a fixation on short-term economic growth ignores, 
for instance, the destruction of natural resources and affects not only the country 
and its population but in the long run also humanity on a global scale. Looking 
toward the future, the constructive approach is that the 70-year-old GDP is still a 
crude estimate. The same applies to the far younger concept of debt sustainability. 
As for debt sustainability, the direct importance of GDP lies in the equations where 
debt sustainability is measured as a function of GDP.
As for deciding between solvency and illiquidity, the diagnosis of whether a 
country is insolvent is complex, yet when dealing with sovereign debt, one of the 
main considerations is that by treating a situation of insolvency as a temporary 
crisis of liquidity means that the risk of a crisis expands in the process. Wyplosz 
(2009, 18) sees sustainability as a function of solvency and sees that both concepts 
are faced with implementation difficulties. For one, sustainability is completely 
forward-looking and, yet, the input consists of historic data. Recalling that most 
governments are eternally indebted, matters are complicated further. Roubini 
(2001) sees that balancing between illiquidity and solvency places a government 
between two unrealistic choices, namely, low spending now and higher spending 
in the future − or vice versa. The effects of this situation are not softened by the 
consequences of quick reactions by credit-rating agencies to particular arbitrary 
ratios and their demands for fiscal austerity programmes – often immediately, 
radically and unconditionally. Consequently, households get scared and cut their 
expenditures, and business is dissuaded from borrowing to invest (see Shiller 
2012). Current practice in dealing with debt is incomplete in the way it does not 
allow for a separation between the insolvency and illiquidity of sovereign debt. 
Debt sustainability is a concept that drives the interest of lenders, steered by 
the question of ‘when is a debt too big to be repaid’, as in lenders losing their 
money. The principles behind debt sustainability date back to the debt crises of 
Latin America and Africa, and they have today been transported to Europe. In Latin 
America and Africa, debt sustainability constitutes the core of the eligibility criteria 
in applying for debt relief programmes of the development aid budgets of donor 
countries. In Europe, debt sustainability assessments are entrusted into the hands 
of the troika of the European Central Bank, the IMF and the EU Commission. 
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It may be impossible to come up with a methodology for assessing debt 
sustainability that is transferrable between countries. There are four particular 
reasons for this. One, the composition of debt differs, and, as seen, the dynamics 
of and between these differ. The situation of problem debt in Latin America in the 
1980s was mainly a crisis of commercial debt but in the 1990s it was public debt 
that caused problems in Africa. Today, a main part of Japan’s debt is domestic 
whereas the USA is indebted abroad. 
Two, countries that issue their own currency (the United Kingdom, the USA, 
Japan) have different ways of dealing with debt than countries that do not (such 
as members of the Euro zone). A related point is that the effects of debt differ 
depending on whether a country’s exchange rate is floating (USD, GBP, yen) or fixed 
(within the Euro zone countries are unable to devaluate their currency). Attempts at 
pinpointing at what debt levels economic growth slows down have identified these 
at between 64–90 per cent of government debt-to-GDP, depending on the income 
levels of the countries (see Caner et al. 2011, 73; Manasse et al. 2003; Reinhart 
& Rogoff 2010). Building on the critical reactions to these, as raised earlier, the 
importance is here to highlight why the sovereign debt of different nations may not 
fit into an econometric closed-model scheme.
Three, according to public opinion, debt intolerance in other countries is due 
to poor policies, institutions or governance. UNCTAD (2009b, 3) rejects this 
conventional wisdom and argues that the key determinants of debt intolerance are 
the economic and debt structure of low-income countries.6 This relates both to the 
composition of trade, and it also underlines the dependency relations between the 
creditors and donors vis-à-vis the indebted nation.
Four, the process of financialisation has accelerated fast and today it constitutes 
a major factor, radically different more sophisticated and complex from what it 
was in the 1980s. With the 1940s and the creation of our global financial order 
as a backdrop, as mentioned earlier, today’s economies use finance as the 
overwhelming capital mover, in contrast to trade, meaning that the balance of 
payments of countries are now different and have to be treated differently. Yet, the 
practical aspect of debt relief as a consequence of debt sustainability is focused on 
the current accounts of poor countries (Sachs 1995; Stiglitz 2010c). 
Ideas about assessing and dealing with unsustainable debt in an orderly way 
and according to universal criteria are clearly needed. The initiatives must be 
separate from strategies for dealing with immediate crises, and the focus must be 
wider than that allowed by empirical methodology.
6  Debt intolerance stands for the phenomena when low-income countries suffer debt crisis at 
relatively low debt levels if compared to the standard of advanced economies (UNCTAD 2009b, 3).
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III. Alternatives ways of thinking and 
doing debt sustainability
The standardized prescription of austerity policy as a means to correct the debt 
imbalances of a nation is not justified in the literature (see Blanchard & Leigh 2013; 
Herndon et al. 2013 for evidence casting doubt on these policy prescriptions). In 
addition, traditional debt sustainability assessments focus on mechanical, technical 
and empirical aspects. The experience of the post-World War II period in dealing 
with sovereign debt can be summed up in a few observations. The measurement 
of debt sustainability does not appropriately address the effects problem debt has 
on economic growth. Nor does it address its effects on human development, as for 
instance on poverty reduction, or, as we have seen in Europe, on the poverty that 
problem debt causes. Rather, as a rule, repayment of debt is prioritized over human 
rights and human dignity (see Council of Europe 2013 for how this takes place in 
Europe).7 The complexity of different types of debt is a warning for the analysis 
of external sustainability, in particular for drawing an analogy between it and 
calculations of sovereign debt (UNCTAD 2009b, 22). Further, it is worth repeating 
the importance of distinguishing between a temporary shock and endemic policy 
indiscipline as the root causes of problem debt (Wyplosz 2009, 21). If this is not 
done properly, it could mean that the roles of the composition of trade and current 
account imbalances are overlooked, as discussed earlier. Also, policy responses 
are ad hoc and reactive to a sudden crisis of sovereign debt. Finally, in Europe, 
debt relief packages and rescue loans have not only continued earlier established 
traditions, they have also reverted to the vocabulary of conditionality, abandoned 
over a decade ago in the low-income world.8 This use of conditionality is out of tune 
with the principles of democratic will promoted elsewhere, and among populations 
in indebted nations. Thus, the current methodological underpinnings leave out 
dynamic, long-term and historic factors, along with the international surroundings 
and context each nation faces in its own way. 
On the other hand, debt sustainability assessments include the possibility of 
a debt being labeled as unsustainable. The question then becomes how to deal 
with this debt. Given that problem debt appears and reappears if not regularly, at 
least with a degree of certainty, the task at hand is to develop some kind of orderly 
and just mechanism for dealing with debt. This normative task is best approached 
7  In addition to the Declaration of Human Rights articulating basic rights, subsequent documents 
of relevance are the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) of 
1966 stipulating that states have the right and the duty to articulate national development policies 
to implement the fundamental rights and the texts of the UN indicating that every country has the 
sovereign right to freely dispose of its natural resources for its development. Of course, the full 
International Bill of Human Rights, adding the two covenants to the Declaration only entered into 
force in 1976.
8  Whereas the conditions attached to loans to low-income countries have been renamed and 
reframed often as ’partnerships’, the abandoned terminology of conditionality has resurfaced in 
Europe with the Euro crisis. Loans are granted on the condition that the borrowing nation fulfills a 
set of conditions listed by the EU commission, the IMF and the ECB.
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by way of first taking a look at the circumstances under which the contemporary 
system has developed. Three processes of policy practice have played in.
First, the initial policy response to problem debt in the Euro zone was similar to 
the series of crises that started in 1982 with the default of Mexico. In both cases, the 
crises were initially met as a problem of liquidity rather than insolvency. New loans 
were granted to pay back old loans. The Latin American crisis was in its fifth year, 
when Krugman (1988) introduced debt forgiveness and suggested that forgiving 
should be applied alongside financing. The debt crisis was now considered a crisis 
of insolvency rather than illiquidity. Soon after, Sachs (1989) took a step further by 
suggesting that debt reduction could create favourable economic incentives in an 
indebted country. In a way, dealing with debt has remained in this phase. Under 
the guidance and supervision of the IMF, ad hoc rescue packages are followed by 
ad hoc debt reductions.
Further, by the early 2000s, debt sustainability came to replace the concept 
of country risk (Cornford 2009). Whereas country risk focused on the risk of a 
borrowing nation defaulting on its loans, debt sustainability is a more vague 
concept. Importantly, by way of various debt relief initiatives conditional on debt 
sustainability, problem debt is now an entrance point for the creditor into the political 
decision making of the indebted economy. Debt sustainability − or the sustainability 
gap − became an official tool adhering to a larger context, as part of the toolbox 
promoting global governance. It became a matter addressed by development aid 
departments and ministries in donor countries. Without universal rules, problem 
debt and development aid remain labelled as charity, and not part of a rights-based 
system. 
Finally, what unites the situations of problem debt in Latin America, Africa and 
now in Europe, is that they have emerged as a result of the global financial order 
with its institutional frame dating back to 1944. This is because the principles drive 
each country to increase its exports at the expense of its neighbours, or competitors. 
But as noted, this is a zero-sum game. Consequently, we must introduce a wider 
perspective than that of a mere national budget-gap angle aiming at maintaining 
peace in the financial markets. From this perspective, today’s approach to problem 
debt is problematic for two particular reasons. First, the export compositions 
of nations differ and this brings with it the fact that, along with trends in global 
manufacturing, certain nations will always be favoured over others. Over time, the 
list of globally preferred goods is dynamic. Second, according to Keynes’ thinking, 
nations that successfully accumulate export surpluses simultaneously affect 
demand elsewhere in a negative way. A recent example is of course the German 
trade surplus, which has contributed importantly to the Euro crisis. 
In addition to the incremental institutionalization that these three processes of 
dealing with sovereign debt have led to, the general development of the thinking 
concerning debt must be brought forward. Debt constitutes of course an essential 
component of economics, be that in the economy of an individual or a household, 
a corporation, or of a sovereign nation-state. Acquiring debt is a way of securing 
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funding for investments in order to generate future profit. Following this, the natural 
assumption is that those who run up debt are responsible for repaying it (pacta sunt 
servanda). Yet, in the case of default, the idea of modern insolvency legislation and 
debt-restructuring proceedings no longer rests on the liquidation or elimination of 
insolvent entities. Instead, the aim is to remodel the financial structure of debtors 
who are experiencing financial distress in order to facilitate their rehabilitation 
and the continuation of their business. In market-based economies, the debtors’ 
rights are protected. From a moral vantage point, the indebted is provided with 
new incentives instead of being condemned to prison. From the economists’ angle, 
such a remodelling allows for the indebted to generate profits in the future. This 
profit benefits society as a whole through increased consumption and taxes and by 
potentially, or at least ideally, creating new workplaces. With regards to sovereign 
debt however, the system is more complicated. Legally, the government of a state 
enters loan agreements on behalf of its population. In the event of a default, the 
insolvent state cannot be liquidated, and the resources are not necessarily easily 
seized. Rather, the central legal tension is between the rights of the creditor to be 
repaid and the human rights of the indebted population. Without an international 
commonly negotiated framework, dealing with sovereign debt operates in a legal 
vacuum. What is equally disconcerting is that international debt forgiveness, or 
relief, is arbitrary as there is no automatic right to it, nor are there any universal 
rules: it is granted to some countries, but not others, for some types of debt, but not 
others (Raffer 2007, 247). 
A framework for sovereign insolvency proceedings is coherent with reasons for 
economic efficiency in terms of economic reasoning (Raffer 1990). That discussion 
is now taken further by shifting the focus to the responsibilities of the lenders. 
The present approach assesses a debtor country’s ability to service its financial 
obligations, but it says little about the consequences for human development (see 
Northover 2010).9 For instance, what level of debt is sustainable for countries 
where the vast majority of the population lives under a dollar a day (in low-income 
countries) or when the unemployment rate approaches 30 per cent (as in Spain 
in connection to the Euro crisis)?10 Civil society expresses reservations regarding 
the concept of debt sustainability. Eurodad (no date) states that the concept is 
flawed both on theoretical and practical grounds, and on a results-oriented level 
and instead, advocates a concept taking into account the resources the indebted 
9  Stephen Mandel treats the terms ‘debt sustainability’ and ‘debt repayability’ as synonyms, since 
they rely “solely on the capacity of a country to service its debts in terms of export earnings and (to 
a lesser extent) government revenue without regard to the demands on these resources” (2006, 5).
10  The debt overhang of the African continent, for instance, poses major obstacles to the region’s 
prospects for the necessary increased savings and investments, economic growth and poverty 
alleviation (UNCTAD 2004, 9). In parallel to the Euro crisis, in the East, Japan’s debt approached 
240 per cent of the size of its economy in 2012, and in the West, the US gross debt, by contrast, 
is a little over 100 per cent of its gross GDP (Sahadi 2012). Importantly, the IMF (2010), predicts 
that many of the rich countries’ debts are expected to reach 100 per cent of their GDP by 2014. At 




countries need to promote the eradication of poverty. Along similar lines, and picking 
up on the initial proposal by Raffer (1990; Raffer & Singer 2004, 109, 189, 194),11 
the New Economics Foundation supports the replacement of debt sustainability 
with a human rights approach, which protects a minimal standard of living for 
the people (Mandel 2006, 12).12 In addition to factoring political support into any 
debt sustainability assessment framework, the assessment must also include the 
average coupon on the debt, the amount of debt becoming due in the near future, the 
amount denominated in foreign currency, the country’s ability to deliver the political 
and economic adjustments it needs, and domestic debt (Roubini and Setser 2004, 
20). The principles of a fresh start, mentioned above in connection to the HIPC 
programmes, and equitable treatment should be understood in terms of human 
development (Herman et al. 2010b, 492). This means that debt restructuring should 
not only aim at facilitating economic recovery but at guaranteeing especially that 
the burdens of adjustment do not severely and adversely impact the disadvantaged 
in society (Herman et al. 2010b, 492). The NEF refers to the UN charter and the 
obligation by governments to provide a minimal standard of living for their people, 
and states that this obligation should come before any financial obligations to 
creditors. A universal framework would also transform the charity-based system 
of debt rescue packages into a rights-based framework based on just principles. 
Putting aside the discussions on the process of creating a framework for 
sovereign insolvency, the principles it would stand on and the format it would have, 
because these could be accommodated to some degree, the basic idea is to create 
a mechanism, perhaps a panel, for assessing debts claimed to be problem debts. 
The approach of dealing with debt according to peoples’ human rights under such 
a panel would bring about at least two changes. First, the sustainability of debts 
would be determined not by the creditors, but by a third party. This would not only 
meet the call that debt assessments should include experts from elsewhere than 
international financial institutions, themselves creditors and donors to the indebted 
nations (Wyplosz 2009). If properly implemented it would provide a position of 
legal equality for both creditors and debtors, with an independent judge, jury and 
executioner. Second, debts would have to be treated on a case-by-case basis. 
Different types of sovereign debt represent different types of vulnerabilites, the 
level and composition of debt and the interaction between public and private debt 
have not got the attention they merit (UNCTAD 2009b, 19, 20). Both the reason 
behind the debt build-up must be taken into consideration, as well as the dynamics 
by which the debts change shape – from private to public, for instance – and any 
attempt at measuring sustainability must include a thorough analysis of the causes 
11  Raffer has attempted to refer the measurement of debt indicators, or indicators of debt servicing. 
He suggests basing the index on the debt overhang, or debt due, rather than on payments made, 
see Raffer and Singer (2004, 176–7).
12  A human rights approach could be specified in terms of the right to food, the right to education, 
and the right to health (Cheru 2006, 42).
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of indebtedness (UNCTAD 2009b, 22). Such a panel could also respond to claims 
of debt being odious. 
In some cases, doubt will arise over the use of and procedure behind acquiring 
the borrowed funds in the first place and, consequently, some debt is claimed to 
be ‘odious’ and therefore not reimbursable. Odious debt was originally defined as 
debts that have been incurred by dictatorial regimes for their own benefit (absence 
of consent), and against the interests of the population of a state (absence of 
benefit), without its consent and with the full awareness of the creditor (credit 
awareness) (Sack 1927). Claims of debt being odious come under a different 
jurisdiction than debt acquired on economic grounds (see Sehm Patomäki 2011). 
A debt can be odious regardless of the economic state of affairs of the nation in 
question. An independent panel or mechanism could easily be set up to respond to 
claims pertaining to both jurisdictions. Dealing with debts in this way would update 
the global financial order, a novelty stapled to the broader goal of both economic 
efficiency and justice. It would also bring with it elements of justice, even elements 
of global justice in the way that creditors and debtors would deal with a third party 
institution or entity. 
Sovereign lending is based on the mere assumption that loans will be repaid. 
This assumption is largely based on the threat of markets punishing nations that 
repudiate or default on their debt. Yet, this threat has proven to be exaggerated, 
mostly because markets are forward-looking and concerned with the prospect 
of future winnings (Stiglitz 2010a, 48). Nations that default on their debt are not 
excluded from the market for forever, or even for very long. In contrast, their 
economic outlook is far better after restructuring. To illustrate, five years after the 
Russian default in 1998, its sovereign debt was upgraded to investment grade 
(Gorbunov 2010). Following the Argentinean default of 2001, its annual GDP 
growth rate averaged nearly nine per cent between 2003 and 2007 (Stiglitz 2011a). 
In Europe, Iceland, the only country that repudiated its debts is the nation that has 
emerged the fastest from the financial crisis. The question is not whether a country 
can default but how this is done and dealt with.13 The interest lies in justifying the 
declaration of default by the indebted nation and, then, how to base this declaration 
on unsustainable debts.
IV. Conclusion
This article makes a case for lifting debt sustainability away from its present place 
between external debt and GDP. Its new place should be between problem debt 
13  In reality, of course, the situation is more complex. The gun-boat diplomacy of the past has now 
been replaced with a more subtle creditor-dominated diplomacy. Soederberg (2005, 929) points 
out that what remains unchanged are the underlying relations of power in the international credit 
system. This does not, however, lessen the fact that sovereign defaults do take place, debts are left 
unpaid and the economic situation of a country generally takes a turn for the better only following a 
(sufficient) reorganisation of its debts. 
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on the one side and human rights on the other, where social and economic rights 
are respected and a minimal standard of living for the people is protected. This new 
place should be framed with the criteria for who decides when a debt is sustainable, 
and how this should be acted on. Because of the specific characteristics of 
sovereign debt, the alarm of default must be set by the debtor, not the creditor(s), 
and, given this, the decision of a nation to declare its default is always political, 
not economic. The economics of the matter is that the single creditor, and usually 
many altogether, is assumed to have a more restricted view into the overall financial 
and political situation than the indebted nation itself. The politics is that problem 
debt has developed into a state of affairs whereby creditors have control over the 
sovereign democratic will of the indebted peoples because, ultimately, a nation 
possesses immense resources to draw from in the form of taxation, privatization, 
savings and perhaps diversification of exports. Yet, it is for the national government 
to judge when the threshold of austerity measures is passed, or when it is politically 
unsustainable. A debt’s sustainability is a highly political assessment that cannot 
be confined to economic parameters, or costs, alone. When a country faces high 
unemployment levels and its education and social systems are run down because 
of lack of funds, it is time for the government to listen to the street protesters and 
declare its debts unsustainable. 
Such a way of dealing with debt suggests that an adequate analysis of problem 
debt must be done separately for each nation and by each nation itself. The different 
forms of debt, the history behind how they have been aquired and indicators of 
the country’s resources must be taken into consideration. The complexity of the 
excercise suggets that one is hard-pressed to find a standard or uniform formula. 
The process of assessing debt sustainability is still incomplete. The process 
should be simple for it to be transparent, yet it should be unique to allow for nation-
specific situations to be taken into consideration. This means that it cannot be a 
routine procedure adhering to a standardised formula. 
Finally, as these considerations and conclusions suggest, even the best 
possible design of debt sustainability – or debt (in)tolerance – is bound to be unable 
to prevent defaults by nations. The international financial system must be updated 
with a debt resolution mechanism. The putting in place of such a mechanism would 
provide nations with the opportunity to deal with their debts in an orderly way. 
Meanwhile, debt sustainability must be carefully thought through. This is because 
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